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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the relationship between Cournot and 
Stackelberg equilibrium, and whether rational expected profit 
maximizing behavior of firms can help decide when noncooperative 
equilibrium might correspond to a Cournot equilibrium and when 
might it correspond to a Stackelberg equilibrium. An extensive 
form game is constructed with subgames whose Nash equilibra are 
Cournot and Stackelberg e quilibrium. F.quilibria of this larger 
game are studied. In a particular example with passive consumers, 
sufficient conditions for an industry to exhibit a Stackelberg 
structure, are obtained. Systematic changes in the properties of 
the equilibrium with changes in some specific exogenous 
characteristics of the market, are examined. This research hopes 
to help provide insight into circumstances under which one can 
endogenously determine a dominant player. 
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1 • INTRODUCTION
There have been two classical ways of modeling the behavior of 
firms in oligopolies. The models differ in their assumptions about 
firm behaviour and result in different equilibrium outcomes. In one 
set of models, it is assumed that the firms in a market play a Cournot 
game with each other. A Cournot game is a noncooperative game in 
extensive form in which the players are in the same strategic position 
with respect to each other. That is, the players move simultaneously 
(or se quentially but unobservably) and their strategy spaces are 
isomorphic to each other. An example of the Nash equilibrium of such 
a game is the Cournot equilibrium. 
In the other type of models, it is assumed that the firms play 
a noncooperative game in which some of the players are in a dominant 
strategic position with respect to some others. Such a game is called 
a Stackelberg game. Here, the dominant players move first and have 
strategy spaces that are not isomorphic to those of the other players. 
Moreover, these are games of perfect information and the payoffs to a 
player, among other things, also depend upon when a player moves. 
Thus, in order to be able to know how to model an industry--
Cournot game or Stackelberg game--it would be sufficient to examine 
timing and information conditions both of which are presumed 
exogenous. The sizes or technologies of firms, or the characteristics 
of demand, are in this context, irrelevant. On the other hand there 
is a "Folk Theorem" that outcomes in oligopolies are best modeled by 
Cournot equilibria if the firms are of equal size, but by Stackelberg 
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equilibria if they are not. This suggests the possibility that timing 
and information conditions could be endogenously determined using 
among other things, firm sizes or technologies as exogenous. 
However, unless one is able to obtain a systematic relation 
between these exogenous characteristics and the choice between a 
Cournot game or a Stackelberg game, one has to make an ad hoc 
assumption about the firms' conduct in the industry. Such would be 
the case as long as one is unable to discern firm behavior in a 
systematic way using observable data like firm sizes or demand 
characteristics. Sometimes this assumption may affect policy 
decisions. Consider for example, a regulator trying to decide whether 
or not to regulate a duopoly. Let the regulator's objective function 
be consumer's surplus. Also, let the firms have zero marginal costs. 
Let the firms' output quantities be denoted by xl and x2 respectively. 
Assume that demand is linear and is given by price = y - xl - x2. Let 
R be the cost of regulating this industry. Under a Cournot duopoly 
assumption, the consumer surplus is 2y
2 /9 and under the assumption of
Stackelberg duopoly, the consumer surplus is 9y2 /32. 
If 2 y2 /9 < R < 9y2 /32 then, while it may be worthwhile regulating the 
industry under the assumption that it is a Cournot duopoly, it is 
unprofitable to regulate the same industry if it is assumed that it is 
a Stackelberg duopoly. Note that in general, using output and demand 
data, one would not be able to infer the type of equilibrium�Cournot 
or Stackelberg--without complete information on the cost functions of 
the firms involved. 
The basic purpose of this paper is to endogenize timing and 
information conditions using data on the sizes or technologies of 
firms and certain characteristics of demand. Thus, we wish to 
endogenize the choice between a Cournot game and a Stackelberg game. 
Since in our model, sizes and technologies are exogenous, we will be 
able to obtain a rigorous formulation and verification of the "Folk 
Theorems." 
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One may try to endogenize timing and information conditions 
(i.e., endogenizing the choice between a Cournot game and a 
Stackelberg game) by simply developing a framework in which the firms 
are allowed to decide which game they want to play. This will not 
work because in general, in a Stackelberg equilibrimn, the leader 
(dominant) firms are better off than the follower firms and in 
general, could be better off than in a Cournot equilibrimn. Hence all 
the firms might want to play the Stackelberg game expecting to be the 
leader. In other words, in order to obtain a Stackelberg equilibrimn 
in which there is a leader and a follower, one would be forced to 
exogenously assign the dominant player. This assignment would be 
quite as ad hoc as making the assumption that the firms are playing a 
Cournot or Stackelberg game. What we do therefore, is to describe a 
game of imperfect information in which ex ante, the players are in the 
same strategic position with respect to each other. However, when the 
sequentially rational Nash equilibrimn strategies are being played, it 
would appear as if the firms are playing the equilibrimn strategies of 
a Stackelberg game or a Cournot game. 
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In a quantity-setting example of the Cournot game, the 
strategies of all the firms are output levels. In a quantity-setting 
example of the Stackelberg game, the dominant firms' strategies are 
output levels while the other firms' strategies are reaction functions 
(i.e., output levels that are functions of the dominant firm's output 
level) . On the other hand, if demand uncertainty is resolved 
overtime, then firms may face a trade-off between making quantity 
decisions early so as to establish a "leadership" position, or waiting 
until the demand uncertainty has been resolved so as to avoid 
production decision mistakes. Thus, a larger game is constructed in 
which there are two logical time periods. There is uncertainity in 
demand which is revealed between the two time periods. We assume that 
the firms behave in a sequentially rational way given the information 
they have in each time period. The firms move simultaneously before 
the beginning of the first period. The behavior strategy for each 
firm in the beginning of the game consists of a probability that it 
would enter in period 1 and the quantity it would produce if it were 
to enter in period 1. If both firms end up entering in the same 
period, the sequentially rational Nash equilibrimn is Cournot-like, 
whereas if they end up entering in different periods, it is 
Stackelberg-like. This will now provide a framework in which we can 
ask how firm's sizes and technologies, and the nature of demand can 
determine whether an industry is best modelled as Cournot or 
Stackelberg. An example of the larger game we are alluding to, with 
two firms and two levels of production for each firm is shown in 
Figure 5 .  We will describe this in greater detail in section 2. The 
basic results of this paper are about the nature of the sequentially 
rational Nash equilibrilllD of this larger game and are the following: 
1. Under some conditions, firms in this equilibrilllD will not 
randomize their "times of entry." E very temporally nonrandomized 
e quilibrilllD corresponds to either a Cournot or a Stackelberg 
equilibrilllD in the strong sense that the quantities produced are 
exactly those predicted by the respective extensive form
concepts.1 This result holds in full generality. 
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2 . With symmetric firms, there is a symmetric equilibrilllD which is 
the appropriate generalization of a Cournot equilibrilllD. (Cf. 
Section 4 below.) This result ass1J1Des a particular technology with 
linear demand and quadratic costs. 
3. With two symmetric firms, UIJ.der certain conditions, symmetric 
e quilibrium must be temporally randomized. This is proved in the
paper using the technology of result 2 , but this result holds in
full generality. 
4. In a market with one large firm and a continu1J1D of small firms, 
the only equilibrilllD is a Stackelberg EquilibrilllD. This result is
true in general. 
5 .  With respect to this equilibrium, a market with one large firm and 
many small atomic firms, behaves nearly like a market with one 
large firm and a continu1J1D of small firms. This is also true in 
general. 
8 
We now develop some notations in Section 2. In Section 3, a 
Cournot game, a Stackelberg game and the larger game of our concern 
are defined. Section 4 examines some properties of the equilibrilllD of 
the larger game and Section 5 concludes the paper. 
There are three definitions in this paper which we will make 
in the context of a game depicted in a figure and which will be 
generalized as specified. These are the definitions of a Cournot 
equilibrium, a Stackelberg equilibrium and the equilibrium of the 
larger game that endogenizes the dominant player. We find that this 
is sufficient for the purposes of this paper set forth in this 
introduction. One can conceivably make these definitions more 
general. However, except as noted, our results are valid in general 
and our approach makes it easier to follow the arguments. 
2. DE FINITION S AND N OTATION S 
We recall the definition of a game in its extensive form as in 
Kuhn [3]. However, since only a particular game of the form shown in 
Figure 5 is analyzed, in order to minimize notation, we develop the 
definitions only with respect to the game depicted in Figure 5 .  
The game is represented by a tree. The edges that come out of 
each node represent the alternatives at that node. Nodes which 
possess alternatives are called moves and those that do not possess 
alternatives are called terminal nodes. The rank of a node is the 
nlllDber of moves that are on the path from the initial node to itself. 
The set of moves of a given rank represents a turn for some player. 
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The turns of player 1, player 2 and nature are denoted by (1) ,  (2) ,  
and ( N) respectively. There i s  a path or branch running from the 
initial node to each terminal node. E ach such branch is associated 
with certain payoffs to the players. Often, in a particular players's 
turn, the player does not have information about which alternative the 
previous player has chosen. In such a case, the set of nodes at the 
end points of all those edges is called an information set. For 
example, the nodes J11, J12, J13 form an information set for player 2 . 
In any game represented in its extensive form by a tree, we 
could consider the set of nodes in any information set as the set of 
initial nodes of another game. This is called the subgame of the 
original game, and the tree that follows this information set is 
called the subtree of the original tree. 
The game tree could be uncountably infinite�i.e., there could 
be a continuum of alternatives at some or all of the moves--but of 
finite play length. Clearly, this might lead to some measurability 
problems discussed in Aumann [l]. However, in the game tree of our 
concern, the respective spaces are standard measurable spaces as 
required by Aumann, and therefore, these problems do not confront us. 
N is the number of players. In Figure 5, N = 2 . 
The set of vertices that are not terminal vertices are 
partitioned according to the moves that represent each player's turn. 
This in the player partition { P1, P2, ••• PN}. In Figure 5, the player 
partition is {P1, P2} where P1 = 
{1112, ••• 17
1 and
P2 = {111,
112·113·12····161'162'
111·1121• 
B is the set of branches (denoted by b) . Since randomized 
strategies may be played by all players including nature, a 
probability is assigned to each branch. It is with respect to these 
probabilities that players make their expected payoff calculations. 
Gb (B) is the set of probability measures on B, and gb is an element 
of Gb. 
The information partition is a refinement of the player 
partition into information sets Ui for each player i. Again in 
Figure 5, 
u1 { 11 • 12 • 13 • I 4 • 15 • I 6 • 1 7
} 
u2 = {{ J11•112•1131•12 •13•14•15•
{161'1621• {111·11211• 
Ai is the set of edges that come out of node n.
D 
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Alternatively, one could think of Ai as the set of nodes at the end of
D 
these edges. 
Next, Mi is the set of probability measures on Ai and mi e Mi. 
D D D D 
Mi is the product fln ePi 
Mi. 
D 
A behavior strategy for each player is a strategy that 
consists of randomizing over the alternatives at each move of that 
player. Further, since in an information set a player cannot 
distinguish between the nodes, the randomization over the alternatives 
at each node in the information set should be the same. 
Thus for a player i, a behavior strategy at a node n is a 
probability measure si on Ai such that for every information set u, 
D D 
and all n,n' e u, si n s
i,. For this reason we may ignore the n 
subscript n on si. n Let S. be a subset of M.. It is the set of all 1 1 
behavior strategies of player i, each behavior strategy denoted by 
s = i n neP. 
1 
i Let the payoff function be given by s • n 
n : B � R N and Il. (b) be the i th component of Il (b); i.e., the i th 1 
player's payoff. 
Next, let 
s 
and let 
µ 
n 
ieN 
S. 
1 
S � Gb (B)
be the mapping that induces probability measures on the set of 
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branches, due to behavior strategy N-tuples. In general, µ is derived 
inductively in the following way. Consider a game in its extensive 
form that has (n + 1) turns numbered from 0 to n. There may be more 
than one node in each turn, and the particular information set which 
is of concern to the player when his turn arrives will depend upon the 
alternative that was chosen in the previous move. Denote the ith node 
in the jth turn by 
define 
µ 1 
n .. ,. J1 
s_ 
n 
0 
and the set of nodes in that turn by n .• J Then 
µk+l (A*) f s_ (A_ 
;
k 
�j �j 
n A*) dll:k . 
for every �l � measurable subset A* of �1• Since each terminal 
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node is associated with a unique branch in the game tree, µ_ defines 
n+l 
the function µ mentioned above. E denotes the expectation with µ 
respect to µ and EµIC·) is the expectation with respect to µ with ( 0 ) 
gheL 
3. 
In this section, a Cournot game, a Stackelberg game and the 
larger game of our concern are defined, and results (1) and (3) of the 
introduction are derived. 
First, Cournot and Stackelberg equilibria are defined in their 
extensive forms. Uncertainty in the market demand is next embedded 
into the above definitions with players assumed to be Bayesian 
decision makers whose alternatives at each turn are quantities of 
production. 
In the Stackelberg game, the natural time for the demand 
uncertainty to be resolved is between the "entry time" of the leader 
and that of the follower. In Cournot equilibrium, it is possible that 
uncertainty might be resolved either before of after the time at which 
fi:cms simultaneously make their quantity decisions. 
In the extensive form of the larger game each fi:cm is free to 
make its quantity decisions either before or after the demand is 
known. The sequentially rational Nash equilibrium of the subgame that 
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results when both firms decide at the same time (either before or 
after) is the Cournot equilibrium and the equilibrium of the subgame 
that results when one firm makes quantity decisions before the 
information is revealed and the other makes it after, is the 
Stackelberg equilibrium. 
Thus, we want to describe an extensive form game whose Nash 
equilibria, under certain conditions, corresponds to a Cournot or a 
Stackelberg equilibrium. In order to do this, we construct a game by 
combining subgames in which the Nash equilibria are precisely the 
Cournot or the Stackelberg equilibrium. Therefore, we first define 
these in their extensive forms, and then embed these trees in an 
extensive form game whose Nash equilibrium we examine. 
Cournot Equilibrium in its Extensive Form 
Consider the following game, in which there are two players 1 
and 2 and two production levels, high (H) and low ( L) .
[Figure 1 Here] 
In the general multiplayer game with continuously variable 
production, let si e Mi be a behavior strategy of player i. A 
Cournot equilibrium is a vector s e S such that Vi e N, js� e S. f.J 1 1 
with 
E Il. (b) < E , Il. (b) (1) µ ( s1 , s2,. • •  , s i, • • •  ) 1 b eB µ ( s1, s2,. • ., s i, • • •  ) 1 b eB 
where E is the expectation over µ. µ 
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FIGURE 1 
.CD 
H .L 
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Stackelberg Equilibrium in its Extensive Form 
Consider a game in extensive form whose representative tree 
for two players, and two production levels is: 
[Figure 2 Here] 
Stackelberg equilibrium is the sequentially rational Nash equilibrium 
of this game and it is a dominant player equilibrium. 
In the general multiplayer case, let D e N be the dominant
player, who moves first. Again, let fi : B -t RN be the payoff
function, and µ : S -t Gb (B) be the induced probability measure on the
branches. 
Then a sequentially rational Nash equilibrium of such a game is a 
vector s e S such that, 
(a) 
(b) 
_1sj, e MD
E µ lsD 
fiD (b)beB < E µ lsj, 
fiD (b)bsB
\lsj, e MD' \Ii e N, i I- D, ,d'sj_ e Mi
E I , n .  Cb>b B < E I , n . <b>b B • µ si,SD 1 & µ si,SD 1 e 
(2) 
Condition (b) ensures that the equilibrium is sequentially rational. 
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FIGURE 2 
Q) 
H L 
Next, uncertainty in the market demand is embedded into the 
above definitions. Let there be two "time periods." Assume that 
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demand is revealed between these periods. The periods are referred to 
as "Before" (B) and "After" (A) . Thus, nature is conceived of as 
having a distribution over a demand shift parameter y. Recall that 
the reason for introducing demand uncertainty is to describe the 
strategic relation between the players, allowing them not only to 
choose production quantities, but "entry times" as well. In a Cournot 
equilibrium it is possible that uncertainty might be resolved either 
before or after the time at which firms simultaneously make their 
quantity decisions. The players are assumed to be B ayesian decision 
makers. 
For instance, if y had two possible values high (h) and low 
(1), then a representative tree might look like Figure 3a or 
Figure 3b. 
[Figure 3 a and 3b Here] 
In general, let nature's strategy be a particular probability measure 
gy (Y) on Y which consists of the possible actions nature can take,
denoted by y. Y is a subset of R. Let g (Y) have a variance y. y 
probability measure g in an element of G (Y) , the set of ally y 
probability measures on Y. Then if, 
s n 
ieN 
bl. X G (Y)1 y 
The 
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FIGURE 3a 
Nature 
H 
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F IGURE 3b 
CD 
H L 
H 
® 
h 1 1 
In this figure QD denotes nature's move. 
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and µ : S -7 Gb (B) is the induced probability measure on the branches,
then a Cournot-Nash equilibrium is a vector s e S such that, 
Vi e  N, "is ! e M., EI Il. (b)b B <EI, Il. (b)b B (3) f 1 1 µ si,gy 1 e µ si,gy 1 & 
In the Stackelberg game, on the other hand, the natural time 
for the uncertainty to be resolved is between the "entry time" of the 
leader and that of the follower. Again, a simple example is given in 
Figure 4. It is reasonable to assume here that firm 1, which enters 
before nature's play, is the dominant player. 
[Figure 4 Here] 
In general, using the notation of the earlier discussion of dominant 
player equilibrium, and letting 
s n 
ieN 
M. 
1 
X G (Y),y 
a dominant player equilibrium is the sequentially rational Nash 
equilibrium of this type of game. The equilibrium is a vector s e S,
with, 
(a) isn e �
E Is fiD (b)beB < E Is' IlD(b)beBµ D µ D 
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F IGURE 4 
CD 
H L 
h 1 
H L 
In this figure � denotes nature's moves. 
22 
(b) Vs 0 e M0, Vi e N, if. D, .is i_ e Mi' 
2 E ls , . n.<b><E ls' , . n.<b>. µ i'sD, y  1 µ i'sD, y  1 
(4) 
The equilibrium which endogenizes the Cournot- Stackelberg 
choice is now defined as the sequentially rational Nash equilibrium of 
the extensive form game in which each firm is free to make its 
qnantity decisions either before or after the demand is known. The 
Nash equilibrium of the subgame that results when both firms decide at 
the same time (either before or after) is the Cournot equilibrium and 
the equilibrium of the subgame that results when one firm makes 
quantity decisions before the information is revealed and the other 
makes it after, is the Stackelberg equilibrium. 
A typical tree when there are two players, two levels of 
production for each player and two values that y can take is shown in
Figure 5 .  We will refer to this game in general, as the "larger 
game." 
[Figure 5 Here] 
To indicate the Nash equilibrium for the general case becomes very 
complicated and so we will do so for the case of a duopoly. We do 
this to show the explicit relationship between this equilibrium, the 
Cournot equilibrium and the Stackelberg equilibrium. Refer to 
Figure 5 .  
The vector Cs 1,s2) e s 1 X s2 is a seqnentially rational Nash 
equilibrium if, 
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F IGURE 5 
A 
I ® 
�,( J2 
12/ CD 13 
(Similar looking paths have not all been completely drawn) 
Vi# j, Vs� e H., js� e H. J J p 1 1 
E 1 , n . <b> < E 1 , , n . <b> µ s.,s.,g 1 µ s.,s.,g 1 1 J Y 1 J Y 
We are now in a position to compare these equilibria by 
stating and proving two propositions. The second proposition is 
proved in the body of the proof of the first proposition. 
Proposition 1: For two symmetric firms, every temporally 
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(5) 
nonrandomized equilibriwn of the larger game corresponds to either a 
Cournot or a Stackelberg equilibriwn. 
Proof: If an equilibrium of the larger game is temporally 
nonrandomized, then at each node n, for every player i, si is suchn 
that the probability of an edge which is an action about only when to 
enter is 0 or 1. Of course if a strategy is such that if the 
probability of an edge is 0, then � (b ) = 0 for every path that 
contains that edge. 
Thus if si 
1 
is such that the probability of A= 0, and s; is 
11 
such that the probability of A =  0, then the equilibrimn of the larger 
game is such that from equation (5) ,  the set of paths with nonzero 
probabilities is the same as the ex ante Cournot game in Figure 3b. 
Similarly if si is such that the probability of A= 1, and 
1 
s; is such that the probability of A = 1, then the equilibrimn of 
1 3  
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the larger game corresponds to an ex post Cournot equilibrium. Notice 
however that this is not a Nash equilibrium of the larger game tree 
because if temporal randomization is allowed, then at J11 (say) player 
two can find a strategy which will yield him at least as good a payoff 
as an ex ante Cournot, viz, s; which is such that the probability of
11 
A =  1. 
"f 1 Next 1 s1 1 
is such that the probability of A =  0 ,  and s; is 
11 
such that the probability of A =  1, then in the equilibrium of the 
larger game, for player 1: 
Jsi e � 3 
E I 
Ill(b ) < E I ' 
Ill(b ) 11 sl' gy 11 sl' gy 
Similarly this condition can be reinterpreted for player 2, 
and the set of paths of nonzero probabilities is the same as that of 
the Stackelberg game in Figure 4 .  
Notice here that this is  an  asymmetric equilibrium of the 
larger game even when we allow temporal randomization. For person 2 
can do no better against person l's equilibrium strategy of si for 
1 
which the probability of A= O. 
Of course another equilibrium strategy would be with person 2 
h . . h 2 av1ng a strategy wit s1 
11 
resulting in the probability of A =  0 and 
si is such that the probability of A= 1. 
1 
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Also, it is easy to see that a symmetric equilibrium with the 
probability of A= 1 in both s1 and s2 is not an equilibrium of the 
larger game if we assume that ye (0 ,y'), where y' is some finite
value of the variance of nature's distribution such that the gain to 
being a Stackelberg leader is greater than playing an ex post Cournot 
game. 
Thus \/ye (0 ,y'), there can be no symmetric nonrandomized
equilibrium of the larger game. 
Hence we have the next proposition. 
Proposition 2: With two symmetric firms, there is an equilibrium of 
the larger game corresponding to a Stackelberg equilibrium. There is 
also a symmetric (in both timing and information contingent output ) 
equilibrium. If the uncertainty is nontrivial but sufficiently small 
so that being a Stackelberg leader is more profitable than being an ex 
post Cournot firm, then the symmetric equilibrium must be temporally 
randomized. 
4. 
In this section, results (2) ,  (4) and (5) in the Introduction 
are proved. To recapitulate, they are stated below. 
The equilibrium of the larger game has two forms, one of which 
is symmetric and the other asymmetric. It will be shown that the 
symmetric form depends on the nature of the uncertainty. Thus, at the 
extremes of risk (i.e., zero variance of the demand distribution or a 
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"too diffuse" distribution), it is temporally nonrandomized and 
corresponds to a Cournot equilibrium, and at intermediate values of 
the variance it is temporally randomized. A continuous function 
contained in the equilibrium correspondence links these Cournot end 
points and all symmetric e quilibria lying on this path. It is in this 
sense remarked to be an appropriate extension of a Cournot 
equilibrium. This is result ( 2) of the Introduction. 
Next, we will study how this e quilibrium depends on relative 
firm sizes. It will be demonstrated that in a market with one large 
firm and a continuum of small firms, the only equilibrium is a 
Stackelberg equilibrium where the large firm moves before the demand 
is revealed as a leader, and the small firms enter the market as 
followers after the demand is revealed. This is result (4) of the 
Introduction. 
Finally, the following question is addressed: Is the above 
asymmetric equilibrium of a mixed market the limit of the equilibria 
of markets with one large firm and several small atomic firms? The 
answer is in the affirmative. This is result (5) of the Introduction. 
A very complicated model would be needed to derive these results in 
complete generality. However, since what is important is the nature 
of the game tree, rather than the technology of the individual 
players, the results are proved in the context of a particular 
technology where the demand is linear and firms have quadratic costs. 
It must be remarked again, however, that results (4) and (5) hold in 
full generality. 
y 
x. 1 
xiB 
xi A 
b lxiB'y 
The following notation is used in this section: 
is the variance of nature's distribution function. 
- is a production level of firm i. 
is a value of the production level when firm i 
decides to enter "Before." 
is a value of the production level when firm i 
decides to enter "After." 
are the paths that result when xiB and y, the
outcome of the random variable are fixed, 
and xjB or xjA are allowed to vary, 
for all j, j /. i. 
Let the demand be given by p = y - I x., where p is the r 1 r 1 
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price and y is the random shift parameter. Let Nf be the set of firms 
that want to enter the market. At first we shall consider the case of 
duopoly. 
The market demand is given by pr= y - x1 - x 2• The cost 
function for both firms is C (x.) = (x:) for an output level x .•1 1 1 
Denote by OCb lxiB, y) ,  the set of values that II takes for the 
different branches represented by b lxiB' y. Similarly, 
II Cb lx , x , y) is the payoff associated with the particular 
i (°) j (°) 
branch containing x , x and y. From the tree in Figure 5, it 
i (.) j (.) 
is easy to see that there is always at most one such branch. 
The Cournot equilibrium points are then easily seen to be 
and 
E ( ) 
xlB = x2B = �5 
- y - :::z x1A- �2A-5 
While the Stackelberg equilibrium points are: 
3E (y) 
xlB = 
---f4-
x2A = 
The equilibrium of the larger game is obtained as follows. 
Denote 
and 
2 E (y) by E, E (y ) by E_ y y -i. 
(Ey(y))
2 by 'fl-.
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(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
Further, let firm i's probability of entering in period B be \)i and 
the quantity it decides to produce when entering in period B be xiB" 
In the larger game, in the first information set of every 
player, the player has to decide on a probability of entering in 
period B and the quantity it would produce if it were to enter in 
period B. In order to decide on the quantity it would produce if it 
were to enter in period B, the firm has to choose a quantity so that 
its ante expected payoff of entering in period B is maximized given 
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certain beliefs about nature's actions and the other player's actions. 
Thus, player i will maximize over his choice variable xiB' 
Ey(\)j • lti (xiB' xjB' y) + (1 - \)j) lti (xiB' xjA' y) ) if. j 
noting that xjA is the best response function given xiB and y. Thus 
..
it obtains an optimal x iB as a function of xjB' \)2 and E. On the 
other hand, the probability that the ith player will enter in period B 
is calculated in the following way: Given that it is going to 
randomize between entering in period A and entering in period B with 
..
the optimal amount x iB' it must be indifferent (since we are 
considering only sequentially rational Nash equilibria) between 
entering in period A and entering in period B. 
Thus, 
xlB = argmax E {\) x y 2 
n (b Ix. x2B' y) + (1 - \)2) IlCblx,x2A, y) }
noting that x2A is a measurable function of x and y. It is thus a 
random variable. 
(a) 
Similarly, we get an expression for x2B. In equilibrium 
..
.. ..
x iB and \) i satisfy ( i 
..
x iB x jB = � and �.1 
1,2) 
..
\) j \), i f. j 
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and, given that we are now interested in tempo�ally randomized 
eq uil ibri a, 
(b) Ey {� • IlCbl�, y) + Cl - �) • 
IlCbl�,xA, y)J (10) 
Ey {�
. IlCblxA,�' y) +Cl - �)
. IlCblxA, y)}
It is  easy to verify that the values of � and of � thus obtained are 
the equilibrium values. Solving the maximization problem using (lOa), 
we find 
� 
3E + E') 
14 + 6� 
Finally, substituting for � in (10b) above, we obtain 
�3(650� - 648�) + �
2(4200� - 4176�) 
+ �(8850� - 8904�) + (6300� - 6272�) o. 
A solution to the above equation assuming y is normally 
(11) 
(12) 
distributed with mean 1 and variance y, yields � as a function of y, 
the variance of y. We deduce from equations (10a), (11) and (12) that 
the equilibrium is symmetric across players. 
Also, from equation (12) ,  �(0) = 1, and with E = 1, 
�(.0044) = O. Thus, when the uncertainty is nontrivial (y � 0), but
sufficiently small (y < 0.0044), temporal randomization occurs i.e.,
� � 0,1. Also, for y > .0044, any nonzero� is not a Nash
equilibrium. 
Renee there are two equilibria. An asymmetric one 
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corresponding to a Stackelberg equilibrium and a symmetric one, with 
the probability of entering nBefore" given by the solution to equation 
(12) and the quantity to be produced a function of that probability as 
given in (11) • 
Further, note that in expression (11) � = 1 yields � = � 
which is indeed the Cournot level of production (see equation (6) ) 
should both firms decide to go "Before." 
We are now in a position to prove the following theorem. 
Theorem 2: In the above duopoly game parameterized by variance as a 
risk parameter, the equilibrium corresponding to Cournot equilibria 
(which occur at both extremes of risk) are connected by a continuous 
path in the graph of the equilibrium correspondence, and the 
equilibria along this path are symmetric. 
Proof: Clearly from Proposition 1, if y = 0, then � = 1 for both 
players, an ex ante Cournot equilibrium results. Further for 
y = 0.0044, (if E = 1) � = 0, and an ex post Cournot equilibrium 
results. Consider the correspondence di : {y} � [0,1], with
di(y) = �i obtained from equation (12) .
Let us first look a t  the nature o f  the correspondence knowing 
the following facts. 
(a) 
(b) 
From Proposition 2 , di ( y) I 0 or 
1 when y I 0 or < .0044. 
The cubic (12) can be written in terms of y, the variance, 
f (� . y) = �3 (648 (.003086 - y)) + �
2 (4176 (.005 - y))
+ � (8904 (-.005 - y)) + (62722 (.004 - 1)) = o. 
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i.e., 
(c) At y = 0, by Descartes' Rule of Signs there are 2 or 0 positive 
roots, 1 negative root and if the discriminant is 0, then there 
are two identical roots. 
(d) At y = 0.0044, there are 2 or 0 positive roots, no negative 
roots, no identical roots, or 1 real root and 2 imaginary roots, 
and the discriminant is negative. 
(e) At y = 0.003086, there are 2 or 0 positive roots, no negative 
roots, and the discriminant is positive; i.e., there are two 
distinct roots. This is because the polynomial becomes a 
quadratic at this point. 
( f) The partial derivative of the polynomial af�� .y) is never 0 for 
� e [0,1] and af��·r> I o for all y. Thus, the Jacobian of the 
polynomial is never 0 in the range of concern. 
The graph of the correspondence then would look like Figure 6. 
[Figure 6 Here] 
Now, it is sufficient to show that there is at least one 
continuous path from the point (0,1) to the point (0.0044, 0) . 
v 
1 
(0,0) 
FIGURE 6 
.003086 
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_r These roots become 
imaginary here. 
.0044 y 
� Thm aro onlv 2 roo" a< y • .103086
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Let f (�,y) = 0 be the polynomial equation under consideration. 
We know that l,/ (y, �) e [O, 0 .0044] X [0,1], the Jacobian of partial 
derivatives of first order, J ( f (�,y)) I O. 
Then consider any point (y0.�0), with Yoe (0, 0.0044], and 
�O < 
1 such that fC�0.y0) = O. Then by the implicit function theorem, 
3 a smooth function g and a neighborhood NCy0) such that l,/y e N (y0),
JCfC�.y)) I o.
g (yo> = �o 
and 
\/ye NCy0) ,  f (g (y),y) 0 
From observation (e) above, the neighborhood 
N (y0) = [0, 0.0044]. Thus, the continuous path that is required is 
the graph of g. 
Q.E . D. 
Two simple but interesting corollaries follow from theorem 2 
above. The first corollary states that the continuous path connecting 
the Cournot extremes is monotone decreasing in the graph of the 
correspondence d described above. This means that for both firms, in 
the symmetric e quilibrium, the probability of entering "Before" keeps 
getting smaller as the variance of nature's distribution increases. 
That is, as the uncertainty in the demand increases, they are less 
likely to enter the market before the demand information is revealed. 
Corollary 1: l,/y .l 0, W e [0,11. � < o. 
-af 
Proof: Writing � as -fr using the implicit function theorem, the 
a� 
proof is obvious. 
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The second corollary states that given one firm is more likely 
to go "After" as demand uncertainty increases, the other firm will 
want to produce more in the period "Before." Further, this desire to 
produce more is continuous in the probability of entry "�efore," until 
the other firm will want to produce the Stackelberg leader's quantity 
when the first firm wants to enter "After" for certain. 
Corollary 2: 
dl13 
W e [0,1], "'dY'" > o. 
Proof: Obvious from expression (11) and corollary 1 above. 
We next consider mixed markets. The concept of a mixed market 
introduced by Shitovitz (1973) embodies the fact that often, markets 
are composed of a few large firms and several small firms. 
In our context, we will see that if a mixed set of firms (one 
large atomic firm and a nonatomic continuum of firms), are 
contemplating entry into a market with uncertain demand, it is a Nash 
Equilibrium for the atomic firm to go "Before" as a Stackelberg 
leader, and for the nonatomic firms to go "After" as followers. The 
intuitive reason is that each nonatomic firms is so small that it can 
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have no incentive effect on the atomic firm or other nonatomic firms. 
Furthermore, we will show that moving "After" is the dominant strategy 
for the nonatomic firms, and therefore, this is the unique Nash 
equilibrium. 
Denote the large firm' s prodnction level by x1 and the small 
firms' production level by x2• 
Let the set of "small" firms be indexed by the unit interval 
I= [0,1] ,  endowed with Lebesgue measure a. Thus for S ,!;;: I, a (s), is 
the proportion of firms belonging to the subset s. Let x(i) denote 
the amount produced by each firm i e I. The profit associated with 
x(i) is denoted by Il i(x(i) ) .  Let the "large" atomic firm be referred 
to as the firm of type 1 with a cost function C1(x ). In terms of cost 
functions, we say that firm i is of efficiency a, 0 i a i 1 if and 
only if it has a cost function Ci(
•) such that, 
Ci(ax) = a
· c 1(a 
• x )
i.e., cost for the little firm to produce ax i s  a times the cost for 
the atomic firm to produce ax. However, since in this section, a = 0, 
in order to have any meaningful cost functions, we let the cost 
function for the atomic firm be F1 + c1x i and _for the nonatomic firm 
be F2 + c2 x;. Fi, Ci e R, i = 1,2. We are now in a position to state 
and prove result (4) of the Introduction. 
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Theorem 3: With one large firm and a continuum of nonatomic finns, 
with the technology given above, the small firms will enter in period 
A in the equilibrium of the larger game if there is nontrivial 
uncertainty. If this uncertainty is snfficiently small, then the only 
equilibrium corresponds to a Stackelberg equilibrium. 
Proof: We will show that a Stackelberg equilibrium in mixed markets 
with the atomic firm entering in period B as leader and all the 
nonatomic finns entering in period A as followers, is the only 
equilibrium of the larger game provided there is sufficiently small 
uncertainty in the demand parameter. 
Should it decide to enter early as a Stackelberg leader, 
firm 1 decides on its production level, as follows: 
x1 
1 
2 argmax E (y - (x1 + J x(y,x1)dµ))x1 - c1x1 - F1) ,y 0 
where x(y,x1) is the follower finn's reaction function. 
For a follower, nonatomic firm, x2 maximizes ex post profits 
and is the solution to 
yielding x2 = 
1 2 
max (y - x1 - J x(y,x1)dµ)x2 - C2x2 - F2 
x2 O 
y - x1 - x(x1) 1 
2 C2 
where x(x1) = J x(y,x1)dµ. 
0 
Tb.en the profits of a follower are 
1 
Since J x2dµ 
0 
therefore 
�y-- x1)
2 (2 C2 - 1) 
(2 C2 + 1)
2 - F2 
xCx1) ,  we have 
xCx1) J
l y - x1 - x (x1) 
2 C dµ 0 2 
y - xl xCx1> = 2 c2 + l 
x2 
Substituting this into the first order condition for fi:cm 1 yields 
c2E 
xl c 1 + 2 c1c2 + c2
• 
It is easy to show that, when the uncertainity is not too 
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(13) 
(14) 
(15) 
large, the large fi:cm's profits are lower if it decides to enter in 
period A. On the other hand, the fi:cm contemplating moving "Before" 
( i.e., the deviant fi:cm), decides on its production level by 
maximizing its ex ante profits. Tb.us, 
de E - x1 - E y (x (x1)) x2 = 
-
2 C 2 
_
_ E - x1 
- 2 C2 + 1 
(16) 
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so that its ex ante profits are, 
2 1) �E - x1) (2 C2 
(2 C2 + 1)
2 - F2 (17) 
Therefore, ex ante, if the deviant fi:cm wants to compare profits, it 
sees that 
E 
{
( y  - x1>
2C2 C2 - l)} 2. (E - x1)
2 (2 C2 - 1) 
y (2 C2 + 1)
2 (2 C2 + 1)
2 
since E 2 - i2 = var 2. O. 
So for the nonatomic fi:cm it is dominant to be a follower and enter 
"After" for all y. It can be shown further, that if ·the amount of 
uncertainity as measured by y is larger than a certain value, 
depending upon the cost characteristics of the large fi:cm, all fi:cm 
will enter in period A. The proof of this in the case of linear 
demand�quadratic cost is easy to see. A general proof appears in 
[6]. 
Tb.us, we observe that in the case of two identical fi:cms a 
symmetric e quilibrilllD results. While in the case of one atomic fi:cm 
of measure one and a nonatomic continua of fi:cms, with non-trivial but 
small uncertainity, the only equilibrilllD is a Stackelberg equilibrilllD. 
A natural question would be: Is it true that, as we increase the 
cardinality of one set of fi:cms while decreasing the measure of every 
firm in it, the resulting respective equilibria converge to the case 
of an asymmetric equilibrium of a mixed market? 
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The next theorem, which is result (5), in the Introduction, 
addresses this question. 
Theorem 4: With respect to the larger game, a market with one large 
firm and several small atomic firms can be approximated by a market 
with one large firm and a continuum of small firms. 
The proof of this theorem will make use of Theorem 1 of Green 
[2], and is a direct consequence of that theorem. Details of the 
proof will be provided in a subsequent paper. 
S • CONCLU SION
In this paper, we set out to answer the question: under what 
circumstances might noncooperative equilibrium take a Cournot form and 
when might it take a Stackelberg form? In a Cournot game, the players 
are in the same strategic position with respect to each other and they 
are assumed to be moving simultaneously (or sequentially but 
unobservably), In a Stackelberg game, there are some players who are 
dominant, who move first and who are in a different strategic position 
with respect to the other players, Thus, a classical way to try and 
answer the question was to examine timing and information conditions, 
both of which were presumed exogenous. If these were unobservable, 
then one was guided by the "Folk Theorem" that outcomes in oligopolies 
are best modeled by a Cournot equilibrium if the firms are of equal 
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size and by a Stackelberg equilibrium, if they were not. The 
technologies of the firms and demand characteristics were irrelevant, 
On the other hand, we answered the question by defining a game 
in which ex ante all the players were in the same strategic position 
with respect to each other, while demand characteristics and sizes and 
finn technologies were exogenous. The basic idea was that if demand 
uncertainty was resolved over time, then firms may face a trade-off 
between making quantity decisions early so as to establish a 
"leadership" position, or waiting until the demand uncertainty is 
resolved so as to avoid production mistakes. A sequentially rational 
Nash equilibrium of the resulting game was Cournot-like if all firms 
produced at the same time, whereas it was Stackelberg-like if some 
produced before, and others after, the demand uncertainity was 
resolved. Equilibrium with respect to this game was studied and it 
was shown that there are two classes of equilibria, one of which 
directly corresponded to a Stackelberg e quilibrium and the other 
represented a natural generalization of Cournot equilibrium. We also 
showed that in a market with one "large" firm and a continuum of 
"small" firms facing a set of passive consumers, the only equilibrium 
was the Stackelberg equilibrium with the "large" firm as the leader. 
There were also some comparative static results on the symmetric form 
of the equilibrium and how it changed with the amount of uncertainty 
in demand. This confirmed one part of the Folk Theorem: namely, that 
when there are firms of different sizes in an industry, it is best 
modeled by a Stackelberg e quilibrium. 
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On the other hand, we showed through results 1 and 2, that 
even when an industry has identical firms, a Stackelberg equilibrium 
is..!!!- endogenously determined Nash equilibrium. This refutes the 
other part of the Folk Theorem: namely, that when an industry has 
firms of identical sizes, it is best modelled as a Cournot 
equilibrium. 
Further research could adopt the model developed in this paper 
to the framework of a model of noncooperative exchange where all 
agents are treated symmetrically, i.e., they are in the same strategic 
position (such as the noncooperative general exchange model of 
Shapley) . This way one would be able to obtain an endogenously 
determined price-setting monopolist as an equilibrium of a 
noncooperative game. Finally, this model can be used to examine 
advertising and timing of technological innovations as strategic 
market activities. 
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FOO'lNOTES 
1. This result closely resembles an observation made by Guasch and 
Weiss [5].
2. We could have more than 1 dominant player. In general let D c N 
be the set of dominant players the dominant players move together 
but before the other players. Then, the dominant players' 
equilibrium would be a vector v e V with: 
(a) 
(b) 
d e D, sd e Md 
E I . o nd<b> < E I , . o nd<b>µ s d,sjJe µ sd, SjJe 
for every d e D, s d e Md, i e N, i I D, sj_ e Mi 
E 1 , . 0 • 
n. Cb> < E 1 , , . 0 • n. Cb> µ si, SjJE , y  1 µ si, SjJE , y  1 
(4') 
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